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This paper investigates the claim that some truths are fundamentally or really true—
and that other truths are not. Such a distinction can help us reconcile radically minimal
metaphysical views with the verities of common sense.
I develop an understanding of the distinction whereby Fundamentality is not itself a
metaphysical distinction, but rather a device that must be presupposed to express metaphys-
ical distinctions. Drawing on recent work by Rayo on anti-Quinean theories of ontological
commitments, I formulate a rigourous theory of the notion.
In the final sections, I show how this package dovetails with ‘interpretationist’ theories
of meaning to give sober content to thought that some things—perhaps sets, or gerryman-
dered mereological sums—can be ‘postulated into existence’.
1 Fundamentality as an expressive device
In recent work, Kit Fine has suggested that we distinguish what really obtains from what merely
obtains. The distinction applies, in particular, to existential statements. So it may be that some
things exist, but don’t really exist. A comparable distinction (which I here treat as equivalent)
is the following: some things are fundamentally the case; other things are derivatively the case.
Applied to existential claims: some things fundamentally exist; others exist derivatively.1
The task of the present paper is to outline one way of understanding this distinction, and
to begin constructing a theory of how it behaves. To fix ideas it will be useful to have in mind
some putative applications of the distinction:
Composition: fundamental simplism with derivative arbitrary fusion (FSDA).
Fundamentally, everything is a simple, microphysical particle. Derivatively, whenever
there are some objects, they compose something. Tables, rocks, and chairs exist; but they
are no part of fundamental reality.2
1Despite appearances, this is not supposed to introduce two ‘kinds’ of existence, any more than the common
distinction between contingent and necessary existents introduces two kinds of existence.
Following Fine, I will speak of facts and employ the ‘container’ metaphor: of facts belonging or failing to
belong to fundamental reality. But everything I say should be able to be interpreted using the sentential operator:
It is fundamentally the case that p. So no commitment to an ontology of facts, or to reality as ‘containing’ or
‘composed out of’ these facts is intended. Compare (Sider, 2009).
Fine uses the framework for a variety of purposes. See in particular Fine (2005), paper 8 and especially Fine
(2001).
2Compare van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001), Dorr & Rosen (2002), Dorr (2002).
There is a serious empirical issue here about whether actuality (as opposed to some out-of-date Boylean image
of actuality) is really consistent with an ontology of concrete microphysical simples. I do not wish to take a stand
on this, though it is instructive to bear in mind the availability of Bohmian interpretations of quantum mechanics,
1
Set theory: fundamental nominalism; derivative sets (FNDS).
Fundamentally, everything is concrete. Derivatively, the axioms of ZFCU hold good.
The null set, and the set of readers of this essay exist; but they are no part of fundamental
reality.
These doctrines will be controversial in their own right, even for one who accepts the fundamen-
tal/derivative distinction. Other set theories, or other material ontologies, might be put forward
as describing the non-fundamental world. Equally, some would defend a less minimal take on
what fundamentally exists. But the options just mentioned will serve our purpose of providing
toy models for the application of our theory.
1.1 Two interpretations
Why believe in a distinction between fundamental and derivative truths? And, granting one
believes in it, what sort of distinction is it?
Suppose there is a certain clash between metaphysics and common sense. For familiar rea-
sons, one might dislike an ontology that includes causally inefficacious abstracta, or (allegedly!)
causally redundant macroscopic entities. One takes oneself to have pro tanto reason for believ-
ing in a radical and minimal ontology: perhaps featuring only concrete, simple entities postu-
lated by microphysics.3 On the other hand, one might also have direct arguments against error-
theoretic interpretations of swathes of entrenched opinion,4, or for thinking that endorsing such
an error-theoretic views would be irrational,5or one might simply feel that an error-theoretic
view grants dangerous hostages to fortune, and should be disliked on that account. Now, if
the metaphysical arguments one offers can be construed as concerning fundamental ontology,
then one can have one’s cake and eat it: endorse the attractive package of a radically minimal
metaphysics, while endorsing the (albeit non-fundamental) truth of the corpus of common sense
belief.
So a fundamental/derivative distinction may reconcile apparently conflicting philosophical
opinions. But independently of this, the distinction may do substantive theoretical work. Lewis
(1983) argued that we need to distinguish between ‘elite’ properties (paradigmatically, charge
and mass) and ‘merely abundant’ properties (paradigmatically, being grue). Such a distinction,
he argued, was needed in the theories of physicalism, intrinsicality, laws of nature, counterfac-
tuals, causation, dispositions, mental and linguistic content. Hirsch (1993) explores the case for
positing a similar distinction between elite objects (like me?) and merely abundant ones (the fu-
sion of a donkey’s left leg and my ear). Sider (2009) has recently argued that to do the work that
Lewis envisaged, we need to extend the distinction to entities of every kind: the elite/abundant
distinction can be drawn for operators and quantifiers, modifiers and the like, as well as objects
and properties.6
before leaping to the conclusion that the naive picture is refuted by contemporary physics. Notice, also, that
the nihilist metaphysics need not claim that the concrete simples have determinate locations, nor even that it be
determinate how many simples exist. This is not to minimize the threat to the classical picture from quantum field
theory and the like. Ultimately, defending a nihilist ontology requires both empirical and more purely philosophical
questions. Obviously, I believe it is methodologically legitimate to pursue bracket the empirical questions at least
pro tem.
3See for example Merricks (2001). For a different sort of reason for favouring such a nihilist metaphysics, see
Williams (2008).
4See Azzouni (2004, ch.2)
5Certain views on the status of so-called Moorean truths might have this result. See for example Kelly (2005).
6It is another question whether to draw the needed distinction we need to ‘reify’ the entities in question (in the
property case, whether we need to be realists to draw our distinction). Sider (2009) argues that the nominalist can
draw the needed distinctions without reification. Compare also Melia (n.d.).
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Given the trajectory of the debate, it is natural to consider a distinction between elite and
non-elite facts. One might believe in such a distinction because one identified a distinctive
theoretical role that could not be played by the multitude of elite/non-elite distinctions at the
subsentential level.7 Or one might believe in the distinction because it is a way of unifying all
the other distinctions for which Lewis, Hirsch, Sider and others argue.8 So if we have a funda-
mental/derivative distinction, there are pontential roles for it to play throughout metaphysics.
It is one thing to find a role and a reason for believing in the fundamental/derivative distinc-
tion. It is another to say what that distinction consists in. Consider the range of options that
Lewis offers in explication of the distinction between elite and non-elite properties: the elite
might be those which correspond to an Armstrongian Universal; they might be those whose
instances are united by primitive resemblance; it might be, indeed, that the elite/non-elite dis-
tinction is itself metaphysically primitive. We can expect a similar range to emerge as a way
of articulating the distinction between fundamental and derivative truths. For example, corre-
sponding to the option of taking eliteness (or ‘naturalness’) as a metaphysically basic division
amongst properties, one might take the operator it is fundamentally the case that as metaphysi-
cal bedrock.9
This sort of thoroughgoingly metaphysical reading of the distinction is not the interpretation
that I pursue here. Rather than seeing Fundamentality as a metaphysical primitive, I would see
it rather as at most a conceptual primitive. On the reading offered here, the role of the operator
it is fundamentally the case that will be to allow expression of genuinely metaphysical theses
about what there is. It is the burden of what follows to explain how this view of the matter
can be spelled out, and this paper will develop a rigourous account. But it will help to have an
indication of where we’re going, and so to fix ideas I finish this section by sketching the guiding
picture.
I think we can distinguish between true propositions and the way that reality is required
to be for those propositions to be true. That this chair exists is a true proposition. But what
is required, for this to be true, is that there are simples arranged chair-wise (so, at least, the
believer in FSDA will claim). Likewise, that the set of whales is a subset of the set of mammals
is a true proposition. But what is required, for this to be true, is that the whales be among the
mammals (So the believer in FNDS will claim: and if they are a believer in FSDA as well, they
might weaken this still further). Where p is what is required for q to be the case, I shall also
say that the truth of p supports the truth of q. I hope this notion of requirement or support is
something on which readers will have at least an initial understanding.10
Suppose for the sake of argument that we can spell out non-trivial requirements for each
sentence or proposition. That makes possible the following picture of the relationship between
7Consider, for example, Stalnaker’s complaint that Lewis’s theory of mental content requires a distinction
between eligible and ineligible propositions (rather than properties) that he is unable to give.
8Perhaps being an elite property should be analyzed as being the property-element of an elite fact: so that the
reason why charge is elite and grue is not, is that Sparky is charged is an elite fact, and N is grue never is. Likewise,
elite objects would be object-constituents of elite facts, elite quantifiers the quantifier-constituents of elite facts,
and so forth.
Even if Fundamentality itself can’t play this role, the resources in terms of which Fundamentality is explained
might do so, in which case the overall framework is justified.
9This is, I believe, the way that Sider (2007b) reads Fine’s proposal.
10Some might wonder how this notion relates to the notion of certain entities (facts, tropes, etc) making true
the true propositions. I think the relation here is complex. On some versions (Cameron (2008a)) the truthmaking
theorist is attempting to articulate what the truth of true propositions require in exactly the sense at issue here.
A distinctive further commitment is that requirements are all ultimately requirements that certain entities exist
(for discussion of why the truthmaker theorist might be tempted by this step, see Cameron (2008b)). I certainly
don’t want to commit here to the idea that requirements are all existential requirements: a requirement could well
describe directly how things are and not just that such-and-such things exist.
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thought/language and reality. Reality contains objects having properties; enough to meet the
requirements of each true sentence. Sometimes (when the requirements for a proposition to be
true happen to match the surface form of the sentence expressing that proposition) the relation-
ship will be rather direct. If reality contains a spin-up simple, the truth of there being a spin-up
simple is thereby supported. However, what is required of the world for a proposition to be true
needn’t always be so direct.11 Arrange simples chair-wise, and we support not only the truth
(directly) of the proposition that there are simples arranged chair-wise but also (indirectly) of
the proposition that there exists a chair.
On this picture, it will be true to say that chairs exist. But, for the purposes of metaphysics,
we’re not just interested in what the true sentences or propositions are: we’re interested in the
way reality is, in the objects and properties and their arrangements that support the truth of the
propositions. Only the propositions which most directly reflect this are fundamentally the case.
Fundamentality isn’t itself a part of the way reality is, as the propertied objects are: rather, it is
a device we use to enable us talk about the contents of reality directly.
1.2 Theoretical challenges
Two things cry out for explanation here. The first is the contention that arrangements of prop-
ertied objects support the truth of a rich variety of propositions, including some which are
apparently about objects other than the ones we start with (chairs, rather than simples arranged
chair-wise; sets of whales, rather than the whales themselves). The second is the use of ‘Fun-
damentality’ as an expressive device for talking directly about the propertied objects. The ex-
planation of the operator I leave till the end. But the former challenge is addressed now.
The challenge to the view just described is very simple. Consider the proposition that
∃xRock(x). Does not the truth of that proposition require the existence of rocks? Didn’t Quine
teach us that to be is to be the value of a variable. Given that rocks need to be among the values
of variables for ∃xRock(x) to be true, aren’t we thereby committed to rocks?
Quine indeed claimed that the mark of ontological commitment to a type of entity was that
we quantify over things of that kind. In doing so, he was making a non-trivial claim. Why, anti-
Quineans wonder, are we not as committed to the universal Rock-hood, as the individual rocks
themselves, in endorsing the truth of sentences such as ‘there are rocks’ or ‘that is a rock’? Why,
when looking at the semantics of such sentences, do we focus on the values of variables, and not
on the values of nouns, predicates and quantificational expressions alike (the latter including,
on a standard implementation, sets of the individuals we quantify over).12
Quine was giving an account—an elegant, but disputable one—of what is required of the
world for a sentence to be true. In application to existential claims such as there are rocks, it
gives the intuitively appealing result that what is required of the world for this truth is that there
be rocks (and not, that the universal rock-hood exists).
What the defender of FSDA or FNDS needs is a rival account of what is required of the
world for this or that sentence to be true. And in general, I contend that such a ‘theory of
requirements’ is what is needed to make precise the sort of claims alluded to in the previous
section. If our claim is that simples arranged chair-wise can support the truth of the proposition
that there are chairs, then we need a theory of requirements for compound-object thought and
talk that says that what is required of the world for ‘there are chairs’ to be true, is that simples
11We can say that a proposition q directly supported by reality if the requirement for q to be true is simply that
q. Otherwise, it is indirectly supported. These notions will be replaced by more precise notions in the theory to be
given.
12For general discussion of ontological commitment, see Quine (1953), Armstrong (1989), Azzouni (2004),
Rayo (2007).
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be arranged chairwise. If our claim is that whales being among the mammals can support the
truth of the proposition that the set of whales is a subset of the set of mammals, then we need a
theory of requirements for set-theoretic thought and talk, that says that what is required for the
truth of the latter is exactly that the whales be among the mammals.
What we now need, therefore, is a sense of how such a theory might go. It is easiest to
start by finding a way of formulating precisely a Quinean theory of requirements/ontological
commitment. We then use the same resources to formulate hetrodox variants.
1.3 Formulating the Quinean theory
A theory of what is required for the truth sentences will have to specify demands on the world
appropriate to each of an infinite variety of sentences.13 Agustı´n Rayo (2008)has recently shown
us how to present a theory of requirements in such a fashion. Following Rayo, let us use the
notation [p]w to express that the world w is such that p. The idea now is to formulate the
requirements for S to be true by way of a biconditional relating S’s truth (at a world) to various
conditions on w.14
Given this notational convention, we are in a position to give a compositional Quinean
theory of requirements for a syntactically simple language.15
Language
Our object language, L, consists of the following symbols:
1. singular constants ‘ci’
2. first-order variables ‘xi’.
3. non-logical vocabulary: the one-place predicate letters ‘Fi’
4. the identity symbol ‘=’
5. the quantifier-symbol ‘∃’
6. the monadic operator ‘¬’
7. the dyadic operator ‘ & ’
8. the auxiliaries ‘(’ and ‘)’.
13Hitherto, I have talked in terms of what the truth of propositions require. But I am now going to switch to
what the truth of sentences requires. This has the advantage of avoiding distracting questions about the nature
of proposition. However, I take it that everything I go on to say will transfer, mutatis mutandis, to the case of
(structured) propositions.
Structured propositions have truth-conditions just as much as sentences do. Indeed, some would insist that to
specify truth conditions for sentences, we should first pair the sentences with structured propositions, and then give
a compositional semantics directly for the propositions. For the kind of semantics for propositions that I have in
mind, and that would dovetail nicely with what is to follow, see Soames (1989).
14The ‘such that’ locution should coincide with what a world represents to be fundamentally the case. Thus one
who believes in fundamental simplism should endorse [there are no macroscopic objects]@, though he might quite
consistently think that there are macroscopic objects. The challenge—to be addressed below—is to explain how
the latter can be actually true, given the former.
15Rayo (2007) often uses paraphrases into []p talk rather than axiomatic semantics to present various theses.
However, he is explicit that one could represent the ideas in truth-conditional form.
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Singular constants and variables are called singular terms. Formulae are defined as fol-
lows:16
1. If ‘ti’, ‘t j’ are singular terms, then ‘ti = t j’, ‘Fi(t j)’ are formulae.
2. If ‘v’ is a (singular or plural) variable and ‘φ’ is a formulae, then ‘∃vφ’ is a formula.
3. If ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’ are formulae, then ‘¬φ’ and ‘φ & ψ’ are formulae.
4. Nothing else is a formula.
A sentence is a formula with no free variables.
The theory of requirements
Here is a theory of requirements for sentences in L. It takes the form of a specification of a
semantic theory for L.17 In general, we write ‘F¯’ for the translation into the metalanguage,
of the object-language predicate ‘F’. Suppose our object-language is French, and the meta-
language English. Then if ‘F’ is ‘chien’, ‘F¯’ is ‘dog’. Likewise ‘c¯’ is the translation into the
metalanguage of the object-language constant ‘c’. So if ‘c’ is ‘Londres’, ‘c¯’ is ‘London’.
We start with the following:
A. The w-referent of ci is x iff [x˙ = c¯i]w.
B. The w-extension of ‘Fi’ is X iff X = {x : [F¯i(x˙)]w}
C. The w-domain is D iff D = {x : [∃y(y = x˙)]w}
(Recall, the bracket notation [p]w expresses the requirement that world w being such that p).
Next, we introduce the notion of a variable assignment:
A variable assignment is a function that assigns to each ordered pair 〈‘xi’,w〉 an
object z such that z ∈ D.
Finally, we characterize the notion of truth relative to a variable assignment a and a world
w (equivalently, satisfaction) in the following way:
1. (a) ‘Fi(c j)’ is true at a, w iff the w-referent of ‘c j’ is a member of the w-extension of
‘Fi’;
(b) ‘Fi(x j)’ is true at a, w iff a(〈‘xi’,w〉) is a member of the w-extension of ‘Fi’;
2. (a) ‘xi = x j’ is true at a, w iff a(〈‘xi’,w〉) is identical to a(〈‘x j’,w〉);
(b) ‘xi = c j’ and ‘c j = xi’ are true at a, w iff a(〈‘xi’,w〉) is identical to the w-referent of
‘c j’;
3. (a) If ‘v’ is a singular variable and ‘φ’ a formula, then ‘∃vφ’ is true at a, w iff ‘φ’ is
true at a′, w, where a′ differs from a at most in assigning some x in the w-domain to
〈‘v’,w〉.
16Single-quotation marks should be read as quasi-quotes in what follows.
17Aside from the bracket notation, the only non-standard element of the theory is the use of dots above variables
within brackets, when they are bound by quantifiers occurring outside the brackets. This is a technical device in
the metalanguage that for most purposes can be ignored. Full details and a semantics for the metalanguage are
presented in the appendices to Rayo (2008).
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(b) ‘¬φ’ is true at a, w iff ‘φ’ is not true at a, w
(c) ‘φ & ψ’ is true at a, w iff ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’ are true at a, w
Finally, the definition of ‘truth’ simpliciter:18
T. For any sentence S of L, S is true iff it is true at the actual world, @, on all variable
assignments
Extracting requirements
Recall that the bracket notation [p]w is meant to express the requirement that p is true in w.
What we are looking for is a way to find, for each sentence S, conditions on what the actual
world @ must be like for S to be true.19 Let us think first about a specific case, that of the
sentence ‘Billy sits’. From:
• ‘Billy sits’ is true
by axiom (T ) we then get:
• ‘Billy sits’ is true at all a and world @
by axiom (1) we then get:
• the @-referent of ‘Billy’ is a member of the @-extension of ‘sits’
but instances of schemas (A) and (B) are:
ABilly The @-referent of ‘Billy’ = x iff [x˙ = Billy]@
Bsits The @-extension of ‘sits’ = X iff X = {z : [sits(z˙)]@}.
From these and the above we get:
• the x such that [(x˙ = Billy)]@ is a member of {z : [sits(z˙)]@}.
This is the canonical statement for what is required of @ in order that ‘Billy sits’ be true.
Two questions arise. First, does this generalize to arbitrary sentences S? Second, what does
the canonical statement we end up with say?
Under examination, it isn’t too difficult to see how to generalize the technique. In each
case, we start from the statement that S is true, and then reach a canonical statement by a series
of equivalences given to us by the axioms above. The recipe is as follows. We first appeal
to (T ), and then appeal to the compositional clauses (1-3) in a way reflecting the syntactic
build-up of the sentences, to end up a statement of what S’s truth requires in terms of relation
between the @-referents and @-extensions, of the non-logical terms that S contains (along with
18To define consequence for this language, we would further relativize the definition of truth at a and w to an
model giving a domain d and an interpretation i that assigns to each term and predicate a function from worlds to
objects/extensions. In place of ‘w-referent’, ‘w-extension’ and ‘w-domain’ in clauses 1-3, one would use the value
of function assigned by i to the name/predicate at w, and the domain of the model. Truth would then be identified
with truth at the intended interpretation/model. To specify the intended interpretation and model, we would use the
notions of w-referent, w-extension and w-domain: the intended interpretation should assign to ‘ci’ a function that
maps each world w onto ‘ci’s w-referent, as characterized above; and similarly for predicates and the quantifier. I
have suppressed the relativity to interpretations just to minimize complexity in stating the theory.
19Why only @? Well, since the object language we’re working with doesn’t contain modal terms, this issue
won’t arise. But in general it will raise some interesting issues—see below.
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the w-domain). Once we’ve got to this point, we can appeal to relevant instances of the axioms
(A−C) to convert the talk of @-referents and @-extensions to talk of requirements on the world
formulated in terms of the bracket notation.20
This general recipe lets us derive a biconditional relating the truth of some S to some claim
formulated in terms of the distinctive bracket-notation. But what does this say? We can use
the above sentence as a case study. In the case, the claim biconditionally related to the truth of
‘Billy sits’ is:
the x such that [(x˙ = Billy)]@ is a member of {z : [sits(z˙)]@}
This we read as requiring that there be some x such that (i) the (actual) world is such that x is
Billy; and (ii) x is a member of the set of things that, in the actual world, are sitting.21
In general, if we interpret each clause of the form . . . [p]@. . . as the requirement that the
actual world—the reality we inhabit—be such that p, we have a statement of what reality must
be like for the sentence S to be true.22
1.4 Sets
Let us note one crucial feature of that face-value reading. What is required for the truth of
‘Billy sits’ is inter alia that reality contain Billy, and contain sitting things. However, there is no
requirement that reality contain sets. This reflects a distinctive Quinean claim—that statements
like ‘Billy sits’ do not commit one to the semantic values of predicates (in this case, sets),
though they do commit one to things that sit. Anti-Quineans have disagreed: maintaining that
‘Billy sits’ commits us, inter alia to the property of sitting, or to the set of things that sit.
This point is vital, and perhaps not obvious at first glance. After all, the canonical statement
of the requirements that we have arrived at does talk about sets: Billy has to be a member of the
set of things that are sitting at @. However, this is just to note that we use sets to express what
the requirements on reality are, not to say that the existence of sets is part of what is required
for ‘Billy sits’ to be true.23
20To formalize this story would be a task analogous to identifying the ‘interpretative T-sentences’ within a
Davidsonian truth theory. See for example Larson & Segal (1995).
21See Rayo (2008). The reading of the bracketed formula just given corresponds to what he calls the ‘secondary’
condition expressed by bracketed formulae.
22One might object that the instructions given are only partial—since they tell us only how to make sense of
brackets relativized to @, whereas more generally brackets will be relativized to (possibly non-actual) w. This will
be a worry only if we actually are faced with the challenge to interpret statements of requirements which relativize
brackets to something other than @. For the languages in the paper, this issue will not arise, and so the instructions
above are complete as they stand.
Relativization to worlds other than @ can arise if (i) one includes world-shifting (i.e. modal) operators in the
object-language; (ii) if the axioms for what basic expressions refer-to-at-w invoke worlds other than w. When we
are working with an object language for which neither of the above arises, then it is straightforward to see that
the canonical statement of the requirements for S to be true-at-@ conditions are formulated entirely in terms of
brackets relativized to @.
There remains the question of how the approach would be extended to deal with possible theories of require-
ments, for example for modal object-languages. I contend, that the instruction above is still complete even for such
extended languages. However, it is conceptually quite tricky to see what the theory of requirements is saying in
such a setting. This is a difficult question, and one best delayed until we have explored the what the theory says
about the basic case.
23If I ask you to bring me everything that is a member of the set of edible things in the fridge, then I’ve formulated
a request that is met when you bring me everything edible in the fridge. The set is involved in formulating the
request, not part of what is requested.
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A central idea of the theory of requirements is that there is a scope ambiguity in such state-
ments as: ‘the requirement for “Billy sits” to be true is that Billy be a member of the set of
things that are sitting in @’. That statement could be regimented as either of the following:
In @, Billy ∈ {x : x sits}
Billy ∈ {x : In @, x is sitting}
or, in the official idiom:
[Billy ∈ {x : x sits}]@
Billy ∈ {x : [ x is sitting]@}
In the first formulation, the requirements on @ include the existence of a certain set—the
set abstraction scopes under the brackets or ‘in @’. In the second formulation on the other
hand, the scope is reversed. The brackets have narrower scope than the set abstraction, and
consequently it is no part of what is required of @ that sets exist. In principle, we can build a
theory of requirements around either disambiguation.24 But if we want to capture the distinctive
Quinean thought then it is crucial that we resolve the scope ambiguity in the second way. If we
do so, then commitment to sets only comes in when we say things like ‘there are sets’ and not
when we say things like ‘Billy sits’.25 The main use of the bracket notation [p]w is as a device
for making these scope-distinctions explicit.26
24Or at least: we can build a theory of requirements that generates a difference in commitments analogous to the
above difference. The key move is in the formulation of the predicate-axiom. The version of the predicate axiom
above allows us to derive commitments with the narrow-scoped brackets form just given. We will end up with a
different requirement if we start instead with the following axiom for predicates:
such as
The w-extension of ‘Fi’ is X iff [X = {x : F¯i(x)}]w
The requirement on sentences that derived from a theory of requirements containing this ‘wide-scope’ predicate
axiom is then:
∃x∃X([x = Billy]@ & [X = {x : x sits} & x ∈ X ]@)
This isn’t exactly the same as the wide-scoped requirement given in the text. But the more complex form exhibited
here requires of @ that it contains sets—just as simpler one does.
Many thanks to Robert Schwartzkoff for pressing me on these issues.
25I say the Quinean thought rather than Quine’s thought, because it is not at all obvious that Quine himself would
accept some presuppositions of this setting—in particular the set-theoretic and worlds semantics. Quine has a
distinctive take on how one should theorize about language, and the kind of set-theoretic ‘intended interpretations’
don’t have any obvious place in it (there is of course a role for interpretations in general, as part of a model-
theoretic characterization of consequence). But the Quinean views on ontological commitment which are by far
the orthodoxy surely should not be tied to these controversial positions in the philosophy of language—and anyone
who has some sympathy for a set-theoretic intended interpretation for natural language will have to make the sort
of distinctions given in the text, to maintain the orthodox Quinean position on ontological commitment.
26One can see the distinction more clearly if one imagines formulating the demands, not in terms of what has to
be true in actuality for ‘Billy sits’ to be true at @, but what has to be true at some non-actual w for ‘Billy sits” to be
true at w. If, for example, sets existed in the actual world, but w was a ‘nominalistic’ world containing no abstract
objects, still the demands for the truth of ‘Billy sits’ given above could be met. For, given that sets actually exist,
we can perfectly meaningfully talk about the (actual) set of things that are (in w) sitting, and ask whether Billy
is in that set or not. (We can suppose that w and @ share all concrete ontology, so that no complications emerge
as to whether the impure set of things that are sitting in w itself exists in @.) This dramatizes one consequence
of the Quinean way of resolving the scope ambiguity described above. Resolving the ambiguity in the opposite
direction—and so including the existence of the set-of-sitters among what is required for ‘Billy sits’ to be true—
would make that sentence automatically false at nominalistic worlds like w.
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This concludes our sample ‘theory of requirements’, for the non-modal object-language
we’re working with above. It gives an introduction to the key technical device in the theories
that follow—the bracket notation. But it also articulates what I take to be the orthodox Quinean
position on ontological commitment, and so forms a reference point for comparison with the
hetrodox accounts of ontological commitment to follow.
1.5 Anti-Quinean theories
The Quinean view unifies where other theories would draw distinctions. Here are two ways of
characterizing the philosophical task of metaphysics: (1) the investigation of what there is and
how it is. (2) the investigation of reality; of the fundamental nature of things. (1) might be called
‘metaphysics-lite’; (2) might be called ‘metaphysics proper’. If Quine is right, then there is no
distinction to be drawn here: what exists, is what really exists. Talk of ‘fundamental reality’ is
redundant, and metaphysics lite and metaphysics proper amount to the same thing.27 Without
the Quinean account of ontological commitment, and more generally the Quinean theory of
requirements just sketched, we cannot assume that (1) and (2) characterize the same task. In
this and the following sections, we examine ways in which this can happen.
The views under consideration are anti-Quinean, in that they say, for example, that the
truths there are tables, the set of whales is a subset of the set of mammals require of the world
far less than initial appearances suggest. One option in formulating such theories would be to
try tweaking the clauses in the Rayo-style Quinean theory just given. A crucial clause in the
Quinean theory is that the semantic value of ‘Billy’, maps a world w to x iff [Billy = x]w. The
demand on the world expressed in the right hand side of the biconditional feeds through to the
claim that for ‘Billy sits’ to be true, the world is required to contain Billy. A natural thought,
therefore, is to substitute some other weaker condition in the original clause. We might try
the following: the semantic value of ‘Billy’ is a function that maps a world w to x iff x is the
fusion of X , and [arranged-Billy-wise(X))]w. The eventual requirement on the world for ‘Billy
sits’ will only be that the world contain some things arranged Billy-wise (and, with analogous
adjustments elsewhere, that these things also be arranged sitting-wise).
Notice that Billy is still assigned as the extension of the name at each world meeting the
requirement. What is important is that the clauses inside square brackets be free of mention or
quantification over complex objects. The fact that a compound object such as Billy is assigned
as the semantic value of some name no more makes the truth of sentence containing that name
require that Billy exist, than the assignment of a set as the semantic value of a predicate within
the Quinean theory makes the truth of sentences involving that predicate require the existence
of sets. In each case, the metalinguistic sentence stating what the requirements are may yet be
committed to compound objects or sets—but the theory says that the object language sentence
simply is not.28
How in detail would such an anti-Quinean theory go? In what follows, I will outline how
such a theory might be formulated.29
27Of course, that is not to say that one who is Quinean on this point might not want to draw distinctions within
the class of (really) existing things: Lewis’s natural/non-natural distinction, discussed earlier, is one such method.
28Of course, it is natural in this setting to reapply the story to the metalanguage itself, to say that even this usage
is non-committal. But it is important to realize that these are separate issues.
29This will not, in fact, follow the proposal just given, of stating the requirements for ‘Billy’ to refer to objects
in terms of pluralizations such as ‘arranged-Billy-wise’. Theories of the latter form can be given, but are subject
to certain in-principle limitations, of a kind with the limitations that Uzquiano (2004) describes for van Inwagen’s
paraphrase project. The view to be developed below does not suffer such limitations.
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1.6 A non-Quinean theory of requirements
It is vital to the very formulation of a theory of requirements that we appeal a notion of w
being such that p. Whichever way we express it, the notion is at the root of the theory of
requirements. It is this that we formulate with the bracket notation: that p is the case according
to w is expressed as [p]w. Our non-Quinean theory involves certain constructions from this
basic notion. While we can think of [p]w as telling us what a world represents to be the case,
the non-Quinean theory will be formulated in terms of what a world pseudo-represents to be
the case.30 Talking of ‘w representing that p’ instead of ‘w being such that p’ enables me to
formulate the comparison more clearly, but I intend the two phrases to be equivalent.
Given this notion of what w represents, there is no obstacle to us stipulatively defining other
notions. For example, let us say that a world will contra-represent that ¬p iff [p]w. Contra-
representation is a well-defined notion. The actualized world, for example, is a world at which
there are chairs; but it contra-represents that there are no chairs.
Another toy example. Let us say that a world w N-represents that q iff for some p, [p]w and
the following holds:
(p & There are at most N things)⇒ q
Now, if the actual world contains no more than N things, then it N-represents all and only
what is the case at w. But if reality contains more than N things, then the actual world will
N-represent absurdity: every proposition whatsoever. For it will represent there are more than
N things, and substituting this for p in the above gives us that the actual world N-represents
everything that follows from an explicit contradiction.
Contra-representation and N-representation are not suited to do valuable theoretical work.
But they illustrate the possibility of stipulatively defining new ‘pseudo-representational’ prop-
erties of worlds. In what follows, the project is to construct notions of pseudo-representation
which will help us formulate our theory of requirements.
To do this, we need to get clear on what the relata of the pseudo-representation relation
is. Since the central issues arise already for N-representation, we shall explore them first
in this context before defining the theoretically useful pseudo-representation properties. N-
representation certainly seems to be well-defined—the question is simply how best to articulate
it.
The bracket notation gives us a sentential operator—adjoining to sentential clauses to make
a complete sentence. We have also quantified into sentence-position above in characterizing
N-representation. One theoretical treatment of the representation relation is that it holds be-
tween worlds and propositions, and that we understand quantification into sentence-position as
quantification over propositions. Thus the definition of N-representation may be represented as
follows:
N-represents(w,q) iff
∃p([p]w & (p & that there are at most N things))⇒ q
30The talk of worlds representing this or that is familiar from accounts of worlds on which they are abstract
representations. Even Lewis thinks of his concrete worlds as representations—albeit representations that work
rather differently to languages or pictures. This is the key, for example, to his treatment of transworld identity: no
other possible world contains me; but other worlds can be such that I exist, that is, represent that I exist, in virtue
of containing my counterparts.
Of course, with the distinction between fundamental and derivative truths in mind, there’s a question about
whether everything true at w will be represented by w. I’m taking it that what is represented by w is coextensive
with what is fundamentally true at w.
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This presupposes three things (i) some background theory of propositions; (ii) a world-
proposition relation expressed by the brackets; (ii) an entailment relation among propositions
⇒.
One might be uncomfortable with the appeal to propositions here involved. A different way
of regimenting the above characterization of N-representation would involve a metalinguistic
characterization of a new operator ‘N-represents’, as follows:
‘w N-represents that p’ is true iff
There is some ‘q’ such that ‘[q]w’ is true and
{‘q’,‘There are at most N things’}⇒ ‘p’.
Here the quantification is over linguistic expressions (though the brackets still express sen-
tential operators, not a world-sentence relation) and the entailment involved relates sentences.31
Whether one of these formulations is ultimately preferable to the other will depend largely
on background commitments—what one thinks propositions are, what notions of entailment
are available among them, what one’s theory of world-representation is. However, method-
ologically there is some advantage with formulating the proposal in the second way, since what
sentences are and what consequence relations hold between them, are less contentious than the
corresponding issues about propositions. We shall therefore adopt the sentential strategy in
what follows.
Of course, the construction of N-representation from representation simpliciter will only be
well-defined once we have said what the entailment relation ⇒ is to be. For the purposes of
N-representation, we can take it to coincide with a narrow notion of logical consequence (char-
acterized, for example, in the Tarskian model-theoretic way). In more interesting applications,
it will matter crucially exactly what this relation is.
1.7 Theoretically useful pseudo-representation
Contra-representation and N-representation are not terribly interesting, but other pseudo-representation
properties can do valuable theoretical work. Let me flag an immediate issue. Pseudo-representation
properties are extremely cheap. We have already seen contra- and N-representation. We can
let our imagination rip, and define all sorts of other properties. What is significant is not that
we can define this or that relation, but that we use it within wider theory, and defend this use.
I here develop some pseudo-representation properties that will prove theoretically useful, and
then use them to formulate a theory of requirements. In later sections, I will defend the use
of these particular pseudo-representation properties, and address the concern that the strategy
sketched below is underconstrained. For the moment, I ask readers to put such wider worries
aside, and simply concentrate on the construction itself.
Let us begin by defining a paraphrase relation among sentences. For each S, let S˜ be the
result of restricting every quantifier in S with the previously uninterpreted predicate B (for ‘ba-
sic’). Let ZFCU be a axiomatization of set theory together with urrelemente. Let M be a
classical, extensional theory of mereology together with an axiom of unrestricted composition.
Given this, consider the following pair of definitions:
1. ‘w compound-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘[p]w’ is true, and
{ ˜‘p’,M}⇒ ‘q’
31A rival to both of these is to take the sentence-position quantification at face value, as a sui-generis kind of
higher-order quantification (and not, e.g. objectual quantification over propositions). See for example Williamson
(2003) for defence of this in a different setting.
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2. ‘w set-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘[p]w’ is true, and {‘ p˜’,
ZFCU}⇒ ‘q’
Let us suppose that reality contains no abstract objects (in particular, no sets) and nothing but
simple objects. The actual world will represent there being no sets, and no compound things.
But, it will compound-represent there being fusions of simples arranged chair-wise, and set-
represent the existence of impure sets of objects.
Of course, we might want to combine these two, to construct some pseudo-representation
relation such that the actual world will in that sense pseudo-represent the existence of sets of
compound objects:
3. ‘w set-compound-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘[p]w’ is true,
and { ‘ p˜’, ZFCU +M}⇒ ‘q’
We introduce notation for pseudo-representation analogously to Rayo’s bracket notation: w
∗-represents that p iff [p]∗w.
What sorts of things are pseudo-represented to be the case? It depends, to a great extent, on
what exactly we appeal to in giving the definitions above. The more we pack into the set theory
and mereology, and the richer the entailment relation, the more things will be compound- or
set-represented to be the case.
As an extreme example, suppose⇒ is narrowly logical, first-order consequence (as given,
for example, by Tarksi-style model-theoretic characterization), and ZFCU is a first order formu-
lation of set theory with urrelemente. Even if in @ there are really no sets, existential-statements
claiming the existence of infinitely many pure sets will be set-represented to be the case. Like-
wise, depending on what concreta exist at @, @ will set-represent the existence of many impure
sets.
There is not a lot more to ordinary thought and talk about impure sets, one would think, than
follows logically from ZFCU and the nature of the urrelemente themselves. So this minimal take
on what set-representation seems at least a good starting point.32
By contrast, intriguing questions arise about the ambition and achievement of compound-
representation. Minimally, a nihilist reality will compound-represent the existence of fusions of
things arranged table-wise. But will reality compound-represent these fusions as being chairs?
Will it even represent these fusions as located where their parts are? Classical extensional
mereology with unrestricted fusion tells us about what compound objects exist and their mereo-
logical structure. But it doesn’t by itself say anything about the extra-mereological properties of
those compound objects. All sorts of hypotheses about the location of composites are narrowly
logically consistent with bare mereology.
Two ways forward present themselves. We could pack into M inheritance principles for
locations of composites and other properties— conditionals relating the properties of fusions to
the properties of their parts.33 In a piecemeal way, we can thereby enrich what is compound-
represented to be the case, and never appeal to anything more controversial than narrow logical
consequence.
32The principal issue, I take it, will be over first-order incompleteness—in particular, Go¨del sentences. The
folklore has it that these are intuitively true—however, they are probably not first-order consequences of ZFCU, and
so on the above articulation, will not be set-represented to be the case. To address such questions, one might switch
to second-order ZFCU, and second-order consequence (Shapiro, 1991). There may well still be incompleteness
in the theory (though see McGee (1997) for a connection between this and issues of unrestricted quantification).
Some of the incompleteness—to do, for example, with GCH and large cardinal axioms—will be discussed below.
For an alternative take on the status of Go¨del sentences, see Field (1998).
33Cf. Sider (2007a) for lists of some of the sorts of principles we might include here.
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My preference, however, would be to enrich⇒ itself. Rather than taking this to be narrowly
logical entailment, one can take it to consist in a priori entailment.34 I take it that it follows a
priori that a fusion of things arranged table-wise is a table, and that its location and properties
are related in the obvious ways to the locations and properties of its simple parts. Given this, if
@ says that some things are arranged table-wise, it will compound-represent (in this rich sense)
the existence of a table with most of the properties one would ordinarily want to attribute to it.35
In what follows, I will assume that we have a rich notion of compound-representation avail-
able. That means that one way of attacking the letter of what is to follow is bring in general
objections to a priori entailment. It is therefore important to note the various fall-back positions:
(i) narrow logical consequence arguably suffices for certain interesting applications of the over-
all conception (in particular, the set-theoretic case); (ii) even if the pure theory of mereology +
narrow logical consequence doesn’t suffice, supplementing the pure theory of mereology with
various explicit ‘inheritance’ principles may well suffice. Personally, I am comfortable ap-
pealing to a priori entailment. Those with scruples in this regard should feel free to explore
alternatives.
1.8 Piggybacking on the Quinean theory
Finally, we turn back to the formulation of a theory of requirements for a language whose
subject-matter appears to include compound objects or sets. The idea is very simple: instead of
formulating the Quinean theory as a theory of requirements directly (i.e. what the actual world
must represent to be the case), we formulate it as a theory of pseudo-requirements.
For example, in place of the atomic clauses, we will write:
A*. The w-referent of ci is x iff [x˙ = c¯i]∗w.
B*. The w-extension of ‘Fi’ is X iff X = {x : [F¯i(x˙)]∗w}
In place of the previous [p]w which told us what w was actually like, [p]∗w is to be read
via one of the pseudo-representation properties: for example as w compound-represents that p.
34Other options that might do a similar job would be broadly logical entailment, conceptual entailment, or
analytic entailment. I’m inclined to think that these notions come to more-or-less the same thing, though whether
they are as strong as a priori entailment is another matter. In Tarskian terms, such notions can be thought of as
corresponding to truth-preservation in all models of the language that are consistent with the actual meaning that
the expressions have.
I assume that a notion of a priori entailment among sentences is available. This might be a matter, for example,
of some corresponding conditional sentence expressing a necessary primary proposition (cf. e.g. Chalmers (2002)).
The notion may take some finessing—for example, some argue that certain inductive inferences may be count as a
priori (so that a priori entailment would be non-monotonic) (Hawthorne, 2002).
If that is right, I will construct a stronger notion of a priori entailment for my purposes—roughly, A will a priori
entail B in the strong sense iff Γ,A a priori entails B in the weak sense, no matter how we fill in Γ. (As mentioned
above, there is the fallback option of appealing to analytic, rather than a priori, entailment).
35As a referee notes, one might well take it to be a priori in the current setting that whenever there are some
things arranged table-wise (say) that there is some object that they compose (this is of course a different claim to
that appealed to in the text—that if some things are arranged table-wise, and they compose, then that thing which
they compose is a table). I think I can afford to remain agnostic on this issue. If the composition principle is a
priori, then at most there will be a certain redundancy in the definition of compound-representation—as far as I
can see, there will be no conflict.
What would be damaging is if someone claimed that it was a priori that composition did not occur in such
circumstances—but clearly that claim is already in tension with the overall non error-theoretic project investigated
here. To avoid an error-theory, it at least needs to be true that there are tables (and that they are composed of the
things arranged table-wise)—and so it cannot be a priori that no table-composition occurs.
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When we unwind the ‘requirements’ for the truth of ‘Billy sits’ as before, therefore, we find the
following:
• ∃x([x˙ = Billy]∗@; and x is a member of the set of z such that [sitting(z˙)]∗@.
Thus, the truth of ‘Billy sits’ requires that the actual world compound-represent the ex-
istence of Billy; and that Billy be one of the set of z such that the actual world compound-
represent it as sitting. What, then, must hold at reality, in order for this to be the case? That
is, what must the actual world represent to be the case, in order for it to compound-represent
the above? Well, in general, it must represent that p for some p such that from p˜ together with
Mereology, it follows that Billy exists and is sitting. In this case it suffices for this that there be
some simples arranged Billy-wise—for then, given mereology, it follows Billy exists—and that
these simples are arranged sitting-wise—for then, given mereology, it will follow that he sits.
The way that ontological commitments are evaded by the theory of requirements set up
via pseudo-representation is reminiscent of various fictionalist proposals for carrying out the
same job. To contrast it with other ways of deploying the theory of requirements, it wouldn’t be
inaccurate to label the position fictionalist. But the pseudo-representation story just given has no
truck with any kind of syntactic or semantic revisionism—there is no trace in the current story of
tacit fictive operators, or proposing that words don’t refer or apply to the things that one would
expect. Furthermore, there is no trace of an error-theory: ‘compound objects exist’ is true—
period. So this is not a story where literal content comes apart from fictive or metaphorical
content, with the world satisfying the latter but not the former. In later sections, we will be
elaborating a positive proposal for what the world and language-users have to be like for a
pseudo-representation based theory of requirements to be correct—and it will be no part of
that story that we are engaging in a game of make-believe in speaking a language properly
characterized in the way just sketched.36
36Steve Yablo’s fictionalist proposals makes for an interesting comparison and contrast. One key part of Yablo’s
framework is the notion that sentences have (in addition to their literal content) real content (Yablo, 2001). Very
roughly, real content of S, relative to some fiction F is what condition the world must meet, given that F holds, to
make S true. (This is object-fictionalism in Yablo’s sense. He discusses it and proposes some refinements in Yablo
(2001)).
The relationship between Yablo’s ‘literal content’ and his ‘real content’ is analogous to that proposed here
between ‘what is required*’ (e.g. what @ must pseudo represent to be the case) and ‘what is required’ (what @
must represent to be the case). Both contrast, for example, with what Yablo (2001) calls metafictional proposals,
where S has some conditional content of the form According to the fiction, S.
However, I find it hard to map the proposals onto one another. Obviously the theoretical setting is very different.
As I read him, Yablo’s ‘literal content’ is the content compositionally determined by the semantics of language (it
could then equally be called ‘semantic content’). However it is the real content of the sentence which is asserted
in typical assertoric utterances of the sentence. If so, there is a good sense that when I utter the words ‘the number
of planets is eight’, for Yablo the sentence uttered is untrue—even though what is thereby said may be true (cf.
e.g. Yablo (2006, esp. fn.19) where sentential truth value and truth-conditions of assertoric content are clearly
distinguished as such). There is a clear sense, then, in which Yablo’s theory will count as a sophisticated error-
theory. The current proposal is in no sense error-theoretic.
Connectedly, whereas for Yablo, there are multiple contents of the same theoretical kind interestingly related to
‘the number of planets is eight’—its real content and literal content being conceived as distinct propositions (see
e.g. Yablo (2000, §XIII)—on the current proposal there is (for all we have said) just a single proposition associated
with the sentence, and in addition there is an answer to a question of a rather different kind—the question of what
is required of the world for the sentence to be true. The theory of requirements is a way of answering the second
question by way of giving an axiomatic theory specifying the proposition associated with each sentence. Such
differences will ramify when we consider how the theories interact with the wider context—with metasemantics,
or the theory of linguistic competence, or psychology of language use.
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1.9 Fundamentality
The construction of pseudo-representation is a very general tactic for creating a theory of re-
quirements that will vindicate the idea that there can be truths which require of the world strictly
less than a straightforward understanding of their subject-matter would suggest. We have seen
in this way, that set-theoretic propositions and compound object-propositions can plausibly be
true, without any requirement that the world contain compound objects or abstracta.
Sets and compound objects exist then—one expresses a true proposition by saying so—but
the whole point of the enterprise just sketched was to reach this point without being ontolog-
ically committed to anything more than simple concreta. One wants to give voice to this by
saying: sets and compound objects do not exist. But to say this would be to fall into contradic-
tion. So we need to do something else to give voice to our minimal metaphysics.
What we need, therefore, is an expressive device that will allow us to articulate the situation.
Recall that in the current setting, the requirement for ‘φ’ to be true at w is articulated in the first
instance in terms of what w F-represents to be the case. The basic idea is to introduce an
operator ‘Fundamentally φ’ which will be true at a world w, just in case w doesn’t merely F-
represent that the relevant conditions are met, but really represents that they are met, in the
sense that the conditions hold at w. Thus, a world containing only microphysical simples might
compound-represent the existence of tables, and this might be all that is required for the truth
of ‘there are tables’. But, the idea will be, ‘Fundamentally, there are tables’ should require that
w truly represent that there are tables, not merely compound-represent this. And so, as desired,
this will be false at a world where only the simples exist.
It is one thing to lay out the general idea, another to characterize an object-language operator
that works in this way. The technical puzzle is that in the gloss above, ‘it is fundamentally the
case that’ is characterized by talking metalinguistically about what would happen under alterna-
tives to the actual theory of requirements for the object language. And it is not straightforward
to convert this into a characterization of an object-language operator.
However, we can finesse this issue by supplementing our theory in the following way. Let us
suppose that one is tempted to allow talk of Fs, via the following scheme (where F is a theory
of Fs):
‘w F-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘[p]w’ is true, and {‘ p˜’,
F }⇒‘q’
This tells us what is F-represented at the possible worlds. But to define the Fundamentality
operator, I propose that we add to the set of possible worlds a range of entities of another
kind—one for each possible world (we can let σ be a bijection from possible worlds onto these
newly introduced entities). One might think of these as ‘impossible worlds’ or ‘non-normal
worlds’—but I do not want to be committed to any specific baggage such terminology might
have. All that is required for present purposes is that these be entities which are distinct from the
possible worlds—they might, for example, be natural numbers, or other abstracta with the same
cardinality as the set of possible worlds—and that they have the properties that the following
stipulative definition endows them with:
σ(w) F-represents that q iff [q]w
The idea here is that σ(w) pseudo-represents whatever is the case at w. σ(w) is a ‘faithful
mirror’ of w: it lets us see what w really thinks there is.
The advantage of introducing these faithful mirrors is that we can simply apply our existing
theory of what is required for an object language sentence to be true at each one of them. For in
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the first instance, what it takes for S to be true at w is set out in terms of what w F-represents. As
explained earlier, for possible worlds this corresponds to a requirement that w represent things
as being a certain way—but equally, in the case of these mirrors, this requirement that σ(w) F-
represent that p is just the demand that w is such that p. Pseudo-requirements on mirrors just are
requirements on the corresponding possible worlds. So, without having to change the theory of
requirements at all, simply adding entities characterized as above to the space of worlds enables
us indirectly to talk about what the truth-values of sentences at w would be on a Quinean theory
of requirements—for this is the net result of applying the non-Quinean theory of requirements
to σ(w).
The basic idea is therefore to think of ‘It is fundamentally the case that’ as a modal operator
as follows:
‘Fundamentally φ’ is true at v, w iff ‘φ’ is true at v, σ(w).37
1.10 Summary
Kit Fine’s recent defence of a distinction between what exists, and what really or fundamentally
exists might be given a thoroughgoingly metaphysical reading. But it need not be. Unless we
presuppose a Quinean setting, we cannot assume that we can read the ontological commitments
of the world from their apparent subject-matter. ‘There are rocks’ might not require the exis-
tence of rocks, in order to be true. In such a setting, the operators really or fundamentally are
indispensable conceptual tools: allowing us to give expression to genuine metaphysical theses
amidst a thicket of true but metaphysically misleading existence claims.
I have illustrated this by sketching accounts of the worldly demands imposed by compound-
object and set-theoretic propositions. By constructing appropriate notions of pseudo-representation,
and piggybacking on the Quinean theory, the ontology of a nominalist, mereologically nihilist
world can be seen to support all the truths one could wish for. Clearly, the piggybacking method
is extremely general: I envisage treatments of discourse about universals, propositions, fictional
37In fact, this will run into problems with iterations of the Fundamentality operator—since σ(w) is not within
the domain of σ, ‘Fundamentally φ’ will be undefined at the mirror worlds. To remedy this, we need to characterize
an appropriate accessibility relation: reflexive on the mirrors, and such that w sees only σ(w); we can then define
Fundamentality using standard clauses for a modal operator.
Plausibly, the operator is hyperintensional. Our earlier picture motivates the view that (given the right setting)
universal fusion will be necessarily the case: at any possible world, the existence of fusions requires no more
than the existence of the simples themselves. But for fusions to exist at a mirror world, the world mirrored must
genuinely represent the existence of compound entities. And there is no reason to think that condition will be met.
Thus, it will be fundamentally the case that simples exist, and necessarily the case that if they exist they have a
fusion; but not fundamentally the case that a fusion of the simples exists. Fundamentality will be a hyperintensional
operator.
Even so, it remains unclear whether Fundamentality will be able to do the unificatory job envisaged for it earlier
(to draw distinctions between elite and non-elite properties, operators and the like, as well as between elite and
non-elite facts). Consider two possible accounts of what it takes for something to be grue. (1) the condition on
w for ‘x is grue’ to be true at w is [x is green]∗w and [x was examined before t]∗w or [x is blue]∗w and [x was not
examined before t]∗w. (2) the condition on w for ‘x is grue’ to be true at w is [x is grue]∗w. Now, it may well be
that no world is such that something is grue. If so, then given conditions of style (2) for grue, nothing will be
fundamentally grue. But if worlds genuinely represent things as being green, and examined at various times, then
given a style (1) treatment of the conditions for being grue, we will have things being fundamentally grue. The
prospects for extracting an elite/non-elite distinction among properties given a type (1) analysis look grim. So the
details matter—we need a theory of requirements of type (2) to sustain the promise of Fundamentality.
However, it is in the spirit of the theory of requirements I have latterly been exploring to go for a type (2) theory
of requirements. And even if Fundamentality doesn’t do every job one might have wished, that is not to say that
the overall theory doesn’t provide a unifying account. And indeed, the notion of genuine representation, []w may
in effect be exactly the kind of fine-grained operator required for all these theoretical roles.)
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characters, possibilia, minor entities (e.g. shadows, holes), as well as compound objects and
abstracta, could be dealt with satisfactorily in the same fashion: through construction of an
appropriate pseudo-representation relation and the use of this to formulate a theory of require-
ments acceptable to one who is nihilistic about such entities.
One need not buy into these particular theories of requirements in order to appreciate the
general moral (though I do regard the tactics illustrated here as a highly promising resource
for non-error theoretic nihilists). I mentioned earlier paraphrases and non-piggybacking imple-
mentations of Rayo’s machinery, which can be put forward as a theory of requirements for an
apparently committal language. In that setting, as much as this, one has the need for expressive
resources that allow us to articulate one’s metaphysical claims. And for these purposes, we will
always stand in need of something like the notion of what is really, as opposed to merely, the
case.38
2 Postulationism and Interpretationism
To this point, we have been developing a framework for understanding the distinction between
fundamental and derivative truths. But that doesn’t yet give us any guidance as to what the
fundamental or derivative truths are. A similar point can be made, more narrowly, about the
Rayo-style theories of ontological commitment described above: they provide a way of formu-
lating Quinean and anti-Quinean theories of ontological commitment. But they don’t tell us
how to choose among them.
In these closing sections, I will look to combine the view on derivative truths developed
above with an independently motivated view on metasemantics—the theory of how words ac-
quire meaning. The upshot will be a story about how metaphysics and linguistic practice com-
bine to fix what the ontological commitments of our language are, and hence, what is deriva-
tively true. A side-effect will be that we can make sober sense of the idea of postulating certain
objects into existence. On the basis of a minimal metaphysics where reality contains no sets
or compound objects, we get an attractive picture whereby sets and gerrymandered fusions can
be postulated into existence as and when required. That such a view flows naturally from the
framework developed in this picture, and the minimal metaphysics described, lends consider-
able support for the overall package.
2.1 Interpretationisms and charity
A natural question is the following: what fixes the ontological commitments of our sentences?
Faced with the choice between Quinean and anti-Quinean theories of requirements, what sort
of considerations can we bring to bear?
This question is particularly pressing for the nihilist. For one might think that the Quinean
theory has a claim to be the default view, not only because of its entrenchment in the literature,
38As well as giving an account of Fine’s talk of fundamental and derivative truths, it is interesting to consider
truth-making operators as presented in Melia (n.d.). I am not sure how to give a formal characterization of such an
operator, but generally we can regard a proposition that (a) is really the case; and (b) articulates what is required
for the truth of q; as making true q. Thus, that simples exist arranged table-wise truth-makes that tables exist
(according to the theory of requirements given above). Parallel to truth-maker talk, we might introduce reference-
maker talk. Thus, ‘Billy’ refers to Billy (the fusion of things xx arranged Billy-wise), and the reference-maker
in this case is just that the xx are arranged Billy-wise (it is the reference-maker in the sense that, according to
the above theory of requirements, this is the condition that the world must meet in order for the above reference
relation to hold.
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but also because it just seems more commonsensical to think that, when people claim that tables
and chairs exist, they are committing themselves to the real existence of tables and chairs.
I suppose it might be possible to take the correctness of this or that theory of requirements
as brute. I dislike this approach, and can offer a more satisfying replacement. I regard the
question: what fixes the ontological commitments of sentences? as answered as one part of the
metasemantic project of saying what makes it the case that sentences have the truth-conditions
that they do.
Consider again ordinary discourse about chairs. The datum is that people assent to sentences
like ‘there are chairs’. Supposing that reality contains only microscopic concreta, what would
be the consequences of interpreting agents as uttering sentences whose truth requires that reality
contain chairs and tables? The answer is clear: the sentences would be false. Thus, a principle
of charity will incline us towards an ontologically non-committal reading of the sentences.39
The kind of metasemantic theory that brings considerations of charity most to the fore are
interpretationisms. The general thought behind a principled interpretationism is this: the se-
mantic facts are those described by the best theory of patterns of assent and dissent; where
‘best’ is cashed out in non-semantic terms. Factors that go toward making a theory best include:
simplicity (minimizing the complexity of a theory, for example its syntactic complexity when
spelled out in elite terms) and fit with the data (maximising the number of assented sentences
represented as true).40
I want to suggest the following. There are costs associated with interpreting some discourse
as ontologically non-committal, using the sort of machinery developed above. In particular,
rather than using a simple notion of what is the case at a world, the semantic theory will be
formulated using a more complex notion of pseudo-representation. So, all else equal, there is a
bias in favour of interpreting discourse as committal.
But all else is not equal, if the committal interpretation of the discourse will make speakers
persistently speak falsely. Compared to the massive lack of fit that a committal interpretation
engenders, we can swallow the small decrease in simplicity that is required in order to generate
a non-committal reading of the words.
Thus, in the absence of sets, there is pressure towards a non-committal interpretation of
the set-theorist’s language, by formulating the semantics in the first-instance in terms of set-
representation, rather than representation proper. And, mutatis mutandis for discourse about the
macroscopic, if all that really exists is at the microlevel.
2.2 Postulationism
One interesting result of these considerations, is that it seems we might be able to ‘postulate
into existence’ new objects. Not into fundamental existence, of course: but nevertheless, our
39Matters may be different if we assume the folk go round saying things like: tables fundamentally exist; tables
are part of fundamental reality. If so, and they mean the same thing by ‘reality’ as we do here, then in interpreting
them in the non-committal way we will make at least some of their utterances false: the ones that make the
distinctively philosophical claim that about the reality of ordinary objects. This is not to say that the odds are
suddenly in favour of giving an error-theoretic account of chair-talk in such a population (after all, just because
we can’t render all of their chair-talk true, doesn’t mean we should render all of it false!). But it certainly makes
the non-committal and non-error theoretic interpretation less conclusively the best available option, given the
competing virtues of the simple, Quinean theory. Of course, if people go round treating controversial philosophical
claims as platitudes, then they really have only themselves to blame if they end up speaking falsely most of the
time!
40I take Lewis (1975), Davidson (1974) to be paradigmatic metasemantic interpretationists. The view consid-
ered by Putnam (1980) and defended in Lewis (1984) under the label ‘global descriptivism’ is another variant.
Williams (2007) gives an overview of interpretationisms. Williams (2005, ch 1, 2) goes into more detail on the
interpretationist metaphysics of semantic facts.
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activity can ensure the truth of statements such as ‘there is an inaccessible cardinal’.
The just-so-story goes as follows. Suppose we have a community of mathematicians, who
until time T had contented themselves by speaking of only finite sets. At T , it strikes one of
the community that it might be useful to think in terms of an infinite set. So, she lays down an
axiom postulating the existence of an infinite set. The ensuing theory is so attractive that her
community adopts the axiom in short order. And the set theorists begin to theorize about the
infinite in the familiar way.
Before time T , the apparent ontological commitments of the community in question were
just to a weak set theory we can call ZF−. It will suffice, for purposes of charity, to interpret
the discourse via a pseudo-representation relation constructed as follows:
• ‘w set−-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘[p]w’ is true, and
{‘p˜’,ZF−}⇒ ‘q’
Considerations against excess complexity give us a principled reason against using some
richer pseudo-representation to interpret this discourse. In particular, it gives reason to resist
the use of the following:
• ‘w set+-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘[p]w’ is true, and
{‘p˜’,ZF}⇒ ‘q’
After all, this is just that bit more complex a construction than the previous: and interpreta-
tionism councils us against needless complexity.
The situation changes, however, once the infinite set is postulated. For then, considera-
tions of charity kick in to make set+-representation the better interpretative candidate. set−-
representation is still simpler; but set+-representation is able to render true far more of the
set-theorist’s discourse than its rival. Charity in this case trumps simplicity.
The story generalizes. Given the practice of working within ZFC, a set-theorist might start
to whether there are sets that she cannot prove to exist. She might postulate at T ′, for example,
the existence of the first inaccessible set. And, as in the case just considered, if her postulation is
taken up, charity will override the extra complexity, and the correct interpretation will make-true
the set-theoretic axioms.
Notice how this goes. Prior to T , it was true to claim (even with quantifiers ‘wide open’)
that no infinite set exists. Prior to T ′, it was likewise true to claim that no inaccessible set exists.
But once the practice of claiming there to be such sets gets entrenched, it will become true to
assert the existence of infinite and inaccessible sets.
What goes in the case of set theory, may also go in the case of mereology. One way that
mereological theories can differ from each other is over what principles of composition they
embed. Universal fusion—that every collection of things have a mereological sum—is one
such principle. Suppose (contrary to fact, perhaps) that there is a consensus in a community
that gerrymandered entities such as Hirsch’s ‘incars’ do not exist (even in the most unrestricted
sense); but that medium-sized dry goods like rocks, chairs and tables do exist. It may be hard
to spell out exactly what not-too-complex principles of composition would make these patterns
of assent and dissent true (van Inwagen, 1990), but for the sake of argument let us suppose
that some principle P does the job, so that a charitable interpretation of the language can be
given if we deploy a notion of compound-representation based on a mereological theory in-
cluding P. Now, suppose that some metaphysically minded member of this community makes
the daring postulation: incars exist. Impressed with the simplicity and philosophical utility of
the theory that ensues, the community starts to talk in ways that require the existence of grue-
some fusions. Then, interpretative charity (together, this time, with the attractive simplicity
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of the proposal) makes a compelling case for interpreting the language via a new compound-
representation relation replacing P with universal fusion. Postulating gruesome fusions brings
them into existence.41
2.3 Limits on postulating
Suppose one buys into the postulationism framework. One then wonders about the limits of
the enterprise. Can one postulate into existence donkeys and kitchen tables? Can one, by
postulating, make it the case that things have new properties? Can one postulate that lonely old
women are witches, and by so-postulating, make it so?42
One might think that such worries are reinforced by the appeals to charity above. Isn’t there
always a way to be maximally charitable—by choosing a suitably devious pseudo-representation
relation? Suppose, for example, that in reality, Tigers are striped, but I utter the words ‘Tigers
are not striped’. Now, since @ genuinely represents that Tigers are striped, it will contra-
represent, in the sense defined earlier, that tigers are not striped. So a theory of requirements
formulated in terms of contra-representation rather than representation appears to be able to
give a charitable interpretation of this language-user.
Likewise, suppose that the actual world doesn’t represent anything as being a witch. Nothing
seems to prevent us from setting up a stipulated notion of witch-representation, such that w
witch-represents that q iff w represents some p such that p and the thesis that lonely old women
are witches entails that q. Won’t it then follow that, using this notion, we can make the case that
‘witches exist” are true, with this truth just requiring that the reality contain lonely old women.
Again, charity would appear to push us towards accepting such an interpretation as the right
one.
I take it that it would be terrible if we could trivialize issues like this. But I suggest there
is nothing per se bad with witch-representation or contra-representation, or with the theory of
requirements built from them. The appropriate reaction to pointing out that these are possible
interpretations, is to explain on independently motivated grounds why they are bad and unin-
tended interpretations of the language we use.
Above, I mentioned the concern that charity might give us pro tanto reason to favour the
devious theories just mentioned. But the interpretationist principles for fixing the right seman-
tic theory apply at a level of whole languages rather than individual utterances. Thus, while
appealing to a theory of requirements embedding contra-representation might be charitable in-
sofar as it renders-true an utterance of ‘tigers don’t have stripes’, it would be horrendously
uncharitable in that all sorts of platitudinous utterances (e.g. ‘there is a table over there’; ‘you
look tired today’, etc) would, by the lights of the contra-representation theory, be taken to make
demands on the world exactly opposite to those we would normally taken them to have. So
though one utterance is represented as true which would otherwise be represented as false by
lights of devious theory, the theory would be overwhelmingly uncharitable when we consider
its predictions for all utterances, rather than a single isolated one. Even just sticking with the
charity element of the interpretationist metasemantics, therefore, we have independent reason
to reject the contra-representation based theory of requirements.
The second case mentioned is more subtle. We could lay down a theory of requirements
which inter alia would make the requirements for the truth of ‘witches exist’ be the existence
of lonely old women. The point is again that this is likely to be a bad theory of requirements
41Compare Fine (2006): thinking through his picture of unrestricted quantification led me to the above ideas.
Indeed, much of this essay can be read as an attempt to find metaphysically deflationary ways of spelling out some
of the views he there articulates.
42Thanks to Andrew McGonigal for discussion.
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from the interpretationist point of view. It would render false, for example, many of the usual
platitudes about witches as traditionally conceived: that they have supernatural powers, that they
are in league with the devil. The point about witch-representation, as with contra-representation,
is not that there is anything in principle wrong with its construction, or using it within a theory
of requirements, but that, in fact, there is no obvious role for it within a plausible overall theory
of requirements for witch-talk.43
2.4 Faultless disagreement?
The following situation can arise in mathematical discourse. My friends and I lay down one
sort of axiom (governing sets, say). You and yours lay down a different, incompatible one.
Both discourses are coherent, and perhaps both are mathematically interesting. Perhaps I am in
favour of the generalized continuum hypothesis GCH; and you are investigating an interesting
way in which it might fail.
Once upon a time, we spoke the same language. The pseudo-representation relation appro-
priate to interpreting each of us was, perhaps:
• ‘w set+-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘w represents that p’ is
true, and {‘ p˜’,ZF}⇒ ‘q’
But by laying down and entrenching GCH, I made it the case that the best interpretation of
my words goes via the following:
• ‘w set*-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘w represents that p’ is
true, and {‘ p˜’,ZF +GCH}⇒ ‘q’
Your investigation of a failure of GCH may mean that you are best interpreted via the fol-
lowing (where GCH ′ is some specific denial of GCH):
• ‘w set**-represents that q’ is true iff there is some ‘p’, such that ‘w represents that p’ is
true, and {‘ p˜’,ZF +GCH ′}⇒ ‘q’
43One issue this raises is exactly to what the interpretationist metasemantics is to be applied. Following Lewis
(1974), I have been assuming that it is a story about what fixes the content (and so, en passant, the theory of
requirements) for a communal language. I take it to be uncontroversial that an interpretation that made ‘witches
existed, and were lonely old women’ and the like true, but ‘witches were evil, and in league with the devil’ and the
like, false, would overall be an uncharitable theory. But this is in part an empirical claim about what the pattern of
usage of ‘witches’ is among English speakers. One can certainly imagine situations where the idea of witches as
wise women gained folk currency, and the propaganda that witches were evil was regarded as debunked in the light
of historical evidence. In that situation, it might well be that the theory of requirements given is unobjectionable
(one can also imagine an intermediate situation in which is indeterminate how to represent the case). This all
seems as it should be. What seems important is that the current theory gives no way to simultaneously (a) postu-
late witches into existence; (b) maintain an analytic connection between witches and traditional witchy activities
and characteristics. And I cannot see that there is any threat that the interpretationist metasemantics makes bad
predictions here.
There is, of course, more to be said on the details of the metasemantics itself, which for reasons of space I am
suppressing here. In particular, there are questions about whether we might try to apply it at the level of idiolects
rather than communal languages; how exactly charity is to be cashed out (is it really just a matter of maximizing
the true utterances and minimizing the false ones? Or should it for example be articulated in something like the
way that Lewis (1974) suggests—as the constraint on semantic theory that it match the sentence-proposition pairs
that are arrived at by looking at conventions of truthfulness governing utterances.
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Each of us speaks truly, therefore, within his or her own context.
Do we nevertheless disagree? In one sense, clearly not. For what the truth of GCH in
my mouth requires of the world is different from what the truth of GCH in your mouth would
require. So it would be pointless us engaging in some debate centred on the truth or falsity of
what we say (rather than, say, the coherence of the frameworks we use, or their interest and
usefulness). Each of us, after all, speaks truly, and the other can appreciate this. But this lack of
disagreement should not be thought of as us ‘speaking past each other’ in some standard sense.
We are not using the word ‘set’ ambiguously (or at least, it is yet to be argued that we are). In
particular, there is no reason to deny that when I talk of the null set, and you talk of the null set,
its singleton, and so on, we are both referring to the same individuals.
As before, similar situations arise in the mereological case. Debates between communities
with different beliefs about what compound objects exist, turn out to be empty.
Conclusion
Quinean orthodoxy collapses the distinction between what there is, and what there is in reality.
In the first half of this essay, I formulated the Quinean orthodoxy, and some rivals. Operators
such as ‘Really’ and ‘Fundamentality’ become indispensable to expressing the nihilist meta-
physics; though they themselves do not correspond to any metaphysical distinction.
This left open the question: which of these theories is the right one for the language we
speak? Nihilists, of various forms, might prefer it if the anti-Quinean story held: for then they
would be able to avail themselves of a non-error theoretic account of the discourse in question.
But have they any principled reasons for thinking that ontological commitments are this thin?
In the second half of this essay, I suggested that a general interpretationist metasemantics will
return plausible and attractive verdicts on the ontological commitments on natural languages.
We have throughout focused on two nihilisms: a mereological nihilism that denies the real
existence of compound objects; and a set-theoretic nihilism that insists that the only real ex-
istents are concrete. I identified a general style for formulating a nihilist-friendly theory of
requirements which has application far beyond these two cases; and which is compatible with
many variations on the theories here studied.
If the view of metaphysics sketched here is the right one, that discipline falls into two halves.
Questions of what sets exists, of the special composition question and the like may well turn
out to be issues for ‘metaphysics lite’, and best approached through the philosophy of language.
In addition, we have metaphysics proper: the study of the nature of reality itself. Both are
intriguing intellectual disciplines; but, on this view, both have suffered from an unwarranted
conflation.
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A Appendix: Arbitrary worlds
The languages that we are explicitly studying in this paper are all non-modal, in the sense
that they do not contain world-shifting operators. This simplifies the task of interpreting the
theorems output by the theory of requirements considerably. For if the basic axioms for what
e refers to at w are in terms of bracketed formulae of the form [p]w, and if there are no devices
in the languages whose compositional role is to shift the world-parameter, then the statement
of what reality must be like for a sentence to be true will be take a simple form—there will be
no bracketed formulae relativized to anything other than @. Since I earlier described how to
understand what requirements are imposed by such statements, the story is complete for present
purposes.
Concentrating on a fragment of a language can often be illuminating. But ultimately, we
want a theory of requirements for natural language, which presumably does include world-
shifting operators. So while the story in the paper is complete by its own lights, it is worth
considering how it should be extended into a wider setting.
To pose her puzzle, the objector will appeal to a natural thought about what sort of clause
should govern modal operators:
‘♦p’ is true at a,w iff there is some u such that ‘p’ is true at a,u
Given this, the condition for, for example, ‘♦, Billy sits’ is that there be some u and an x such
that (i) [x˙ =Billy]u and (ii) x ∈ {y : [sits(x˙)]u}. The challenge is then to say what requirement on
reality this expresses.
By the lights of the recipe given earlier, what does reality have to be like for this clause to
be satisfied? Well, read at face value, it could be any way at all so long as a certain condition
holds—where that condition is a long statement about the existence of worlds that represent
such-and-such. What we get by taking our earlier suggestion at face-value and applying it to this
sentence, is that either the requirement on reality is trivial (if a certain q is true) or impossible to
meet (if q is false). Arguably this does assign the correct truth-conditions to modal statements.44
To expand: the general role of a theory of requirements is to bring to bear whatever expres-
sive resources are needed to express complex and coordinated demands on the world. Certain
things need to be presupposed in order that that coordinating function works. For example, if
there were no sets, then it would be bad to use set theoretic resources to express the require-
ments on the world for ‘Billy exists’ to be true. For various p, we need to presuppose the truth
of p in order to say what the truth of S demands of reality. That should not be conflated with
the theory including that reality be such that p among the requirements for S to be true—that
would make the existence of sets part of what is required for ‘Billy sits’ to be true.
Now consider a situation where the condition expressing what is demanded by S’s truth is
expressed by a formula of the form q & [p]@, where q is free of bracketed formulae relativized
to @. View this as a way of formulating a complex, coordinated requirement on reality—in
44It will work so long as modal statements are non-contingent—for the trivial/impossible demands correspond
to them being vacuously true. In an S5 setting for metaphysical modality this is exactly what we get. This is no
surprise, since the simple clause for ♦ given earlier wouldn’t be appropriate to a more nuanced modal logic.
In a non-S5 setting, the natural thought is to appeal to an accessibility relation in the clause for possibility. So
‘♦p’ will be true at w iff there is some u that is accessible from w such that ‘p’ is true at a,u. Notice that u being
accessible from @ might well impose requirements on @. For example, for a nomic modality, for u to be accessible
from w, it might be necessary and sufficient that some laws, L exist, such that [ L are the laws of nature]w and [L
are never violated]u. This will then make the demands on u non-trivial. In effect, the requirements that @ must
meet for some q to be nomically possible at @, is that the laws of nature meet some complex specification that the
theory of requirements specifies. This seems like an intuitively natural result.
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this case, what the requirement in fact is coordinated to q’s truth. if q is true, then the clause is
satisfied iff reality is such that p. If the q is false, then the condition can never be satisfied—so
overall the demands are impossible to meet.
An extreme case would be where p is something tautologous, or where the clause [p]@ is
left out altogether. The coordinated requirement on reality is then vacuously met if q is true, and
vacuously unmet if q is false. So in this extreme case, clauses can still impose (coordinated)
requirements on reality—either trivial or impossible requirements, according to whether q is
true or false.
Interpreted in this way, it might be that the obvious extension of the theory of requirements
to the modal case says nothing objectionable. But that isn’t to say that it says anything partic-
ularly illuminating about the modal. Rayo (MS.) advocates a different strategy for spelling out
in non-modal terms what is required for a modal statement to be true.45
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